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In 1978, China announced plans -for economic reform and 
opened her door to the outer world. Today, ten years later, 
China has experienced significant changes in various areas 
under the waves of reform. This paper introduces the Chinese 
model in a developing a "socialist economy." It briefly 
explores and analyzes the Chinese model of a centrally 
planned economy, and the economic development from 1949 to 
1978. Then, the economic reforms since 1979, which include 
such internal and external environmental influences as the 
Cultural Revolution and the open door policy, will be 
discussed. Progress of reform since 1979, which includes 
budgetary devolution, reform of the state economy, reform of 
the urban collective and individual sector, as well as the 
commune sector will be explored. Key points of China’s 
economic achievements since the economic reform of 1979 will 
be discussed briefly. Finally, future prospects for economic 
reform are discussed in relation to the obstacles to 
progress, since economic reform depends on the progress of 
political, social, and ideological reform. Concerning the 
above issues, the paper reviews some works by several 
economic experts on China.
1
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Currently, China faces many obstacles to the progress 
of economic reform and the development of the economy. These 
include traditional resistance to reform (the party 
apparatus and ministerial bureaucracy, and old ideologies), 
political factors (inconsistency and instability of 
politics, and lack of comprehensiveness of democracy and 
law), economic factors (lack of comprehensiveness and 
internal consistency of the reform and need of some economic 
variables), and human problems (overpopulation, and the 
spiritual situation of the Chinese people).
One objective of this paper, therefore, is to review 
the development of the economic reform since 1979 and to 
explore current bottlenecks for further economic 
development. With reference to the past records and current 
development, this paper also tries to explore various 
factors affecting the future of economic reform and 
development and to pursue the future of the reform.
China is a giant in all aspects but one. Her history 
spans three thousand years; her artists, men of letters, and 
inventors have contributed greatly to the advance of world 
culture and civilization; with almost one-quarter of the 
world's population, the numbers of her people are 
staggering; the size of her territory is comparable to other 
world powers; the industriousness, ability, gentility, and 
occasional cruelty of her people are second to none; and 
their fighting ability, when aroused, is awesome.1 The one
3
aspect in which China has been less than a giant is 
economic.
Another objective of this paper * therefore? is to 
explore the Chinese model of economic development— a central 
planning system* which can in part explain the backwardness 
of Chinese economy.
Ot&3&fcsar 11
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Since 1978, with the open door policy of China* more 
and more Western economic experts have started to discuss 
the issues of the Chinese economy and have written a great 
many articles and works. This chapter reviews some of the 
current literature about the Chinese economy.
Peter Knight* an economic expert from the World Bank* 
explored in detail the Soviet model of a central planning 
system adopted by "socialist” countries including China. He 
pursued the model in five aspects: ownership of the means of 
production* the locus of economic decision-making* price 
formation* incentives to producers* and competition. 
Although simply an abstract* his description of what may be 
called the traditional central planning system is quite 
clear and understandable. He also examined the economic 
reforms in "socialist” countries. From the reform
experiences of those countries* he suggested that the 
success of reform depended largely on "the strength of 
political support* the comprehensiveness and internal 
consistency of the reforms* the length of time they are
4
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pursued without interruption* and the availability of some 
economic slack."
Mhile Peter Knight's comments on the central planning 
system and economic reform are quite general* Gregory Chow 
gave a more specific description of a central planning 
system with a Chinese style. As a professor of economics at 
Princeton University, Chow explored the features of the 
Chinese model of economic planning in terms of the 
interrelationships among individual consumers, enterprises, 
and the government in the market and the roles they played.
He also pointed out that the economic reform since 1979 is
leading China toward a more market—oriented economy. 
However, because of the forces holding back the reform such 
as “ideological resistance, vested interests, bureaucracy, 
inertia inherent in economic organizations, and the lack of 
education among the middle management personnel in
government and in state enterprises," he noted, "precisely 
how far the reforms toward adapting features of a market 
economy will go in the next decade is difficult to predict." 
Chow further stated that the market forces would be by far 
"the major means used by the Chinese government to achieve 
its planning objectives."
The same opinion is held by Robert Dernberger.
According to Dernberger, "the program of economic reforms 
being pursued by the current leaders in China is a
modification, not a replacement, of the traditional Soviet—
&
type economy." As -for the future of the reform, he further
stated that "the economic results of the economic reforms
introduced thus far are so impressive that the
leadership,..., will be convinced of the economic benefits"
(and/or be forced) to continue the economic reforms* even
including systemic reform.
In terms of current obstacles to economic reform and
development* the Uorld Bank covered in detail the purely
economic factors: the prevalence of the old system* the
distorted price system* and the need for some economic
resources such as arable land* foreign exchange* and energy.
It is obviously true that China faces a tough task ahead to
deal with this "resource crisis," as Dwight Perkins pointed
out. However, Perkins put more emphasis on political
support* "The greatest uncertainty about China’s economic
future lies in the realm of politics." He further stated:
If the political environment does remain supportive, 
there is every reason to believe that China will 
undergo an economic and social transformation with many 
features similar to those that occurred elsewhere in 
East Asia. If this change does take place* one-quarter 
of the world ’ 5  population will have moved in the latter 
half of the twentieth century from a closed, poor, 
rural, peasant society to a society where living 
standards are rising rapidly, where the dominant share 
of the population is increasingly urban and industrial, 
and where the nations of the region are fully 
integrated into the international economic system.
By contrast, Chow was more optimistic about the future
of economic growth in China. From the fact that the Chinese
economy was able to grow from 1952 to 1979, despite the
adverse conditions of inefficient central planning and two
7
very serious political disturbances* he noted* the economy 
would continue to grow greatly even though the economic 
reform progressed slowly.
OnagBfoKT 2
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After 1 W »  the year the People’s Republic of China was 
founded* China adopted* with few modifications* the system 
of centralized physical planning practiced in the Soviet 
Union. This model served the Chinese economy for more than 
thirty years.
I. Traditional central planning system
China’s economic system combines a largely urban state 
economy* similar to that of other socialist countries* 
with a rural commune economy of its own invention. The 
state economy is characterized by public ownership* 
centralization of economic decision-making* strictly 
hierarchical control* and little reliance on markets or 
prices. To a greater degree than in East European 
countries* people’s jobs and consumption patterns are 
chosen for them by the state.*2
fflbsms rgghmp <af ftOce c saamsi ®1F pHnnaCaKE-t ioira
Since 1949 there have been three forms of ownership in
China: state* collective* and private. Although their
composition and relative weight have changed over time* none
has ever been fully obliterated. State ownership* in Chinese
parlance* means assets owned "by the whole people." In
8
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theory* these assets belong to the country and its people as 
a whole* and on their behalf the state administers 
them. Collective ownership* by contrast* refers to assets 
which are the property of definite sub-groups who work with 
those assets as in the case of productive resources or who 
produce them or use their income to purchase them.3 For 
example* a production team’s television set is owned by the 
team* not the state. Likewise* the assets of an urban 
collective workshop* run by a neighborhood committee* belong 
to the neighborhood denizens or the workers who purchased 
them.
In industry* all significant means of production are 
state owned. The urban collectives are nominally owned by
their members but for most practical purposes they are
indistinguishable from state-owned enterprises.44 Private
enterprises account for a very limited percentage of the 
industrial economy.
In agriculture* cooperatives are the dominant form 
under strict state control* state farms* which are owned and 
operated on the same principles as state industrial
enterprises* are second* and finally* there are private 
farms on individual household plots* assigned to but not 
formally owned by the families which cultivate them.9 
TThxe IUbcm s mriF oscminasaic dSgscisicmim-oaCsnirtg)
Economic decisions* both macro and micro* are in the 
hands of the state government. China’s system of economic
io
management, modeled after the Soviet system adopted during 
the Stalin era, is "extraordinarily centralized and 
characterized by strict vertical control, with relatively 
■few horizontal linkages-"* The central plan specifies a 
large number of value aggregates and physical inputs and 
outputs in the economy. The structure of the plan is 
strictly hierarchical, and the targets set by the central 
government are dictated to the local authorities and 
enterprises regardless of their suitability. Different 
levels in the hierarchy can bargain over production 
assignments and the allocation of the means of production 
for carrying them out: materials through administrative
orders; labor via controls over the size (and sometimes 
distribution) of wage expenditures; and capital through the 
allocation of investment funds, construction materials, 
machinery, and equipment.7 The country's revenue from most 
sources and expenditures for public undertakings and 
investments are controlled by the central government. On the 
local level, a sum of money may only be used as designated, 
and only a small portion of the local tax income is at the 
disposal of the local authorities. In the commune sector, 
production and investment decisions are less subject to 
central direction than those in the state economy (including 
state farms), and market and prices play a larger role.
IPjrloe -ffflmroavfc i®tra
Virtually all prices have been set by the government
11
through a hierarchy of price bureaus. The central Price 
Bureau maintains a book specifying which prices are subject 
to central, and which to provincial or sub-provincial 
control.0 Prices for most commodities are set by the state. 
The prices of agricultural and industrial goods of national 
importance (around two thirds of total production) as well 
as transport tariffs on major national routes are subject to 
national control. The prices of other goods, local transport 
tariffs, and charges for social services are controlled by 
provinces or counties.9
As for foreign trade, which is carried out by special 
export— import firms, domestic prices are separated from 
world prices by a plethora of taxes and subsidies. As of 
1978, the exchange rate has played a very limited role in 
domestic price formation. Producing firms have no direct 
contact with foreign customers or suppliers.10 
Itrrmsnrffcivtes -fFamr {pnreKdhcoeers
Material incentives are not widely used, and they are 
also limited by the extent to which policy-makers are 
willing to tolerate personal income differences. Numerous 
aspects of the planning and management process have 
inhibited both the capacity and the willingness of 
enterprises to produce products of good quality, over­
fulfill the plan by too large a margin, or operate at 
minimum cost. Production levels at one period have been the 
planners' basis for setting targets of the next period.
12
Other inhibitors of incentives are the cost-plus pricing 
policy and the free availability (up to rational levels) of 
capital, material* and labor.11
There has been little incentive for either management 
or workers as their performance bears no relationship to job 
security or to income. There is a phenomenon called the 
"iron rice bowl" (permanent employment)* which means workers 
are hired but not fired and promoted but not demoted. Once 
an employee enters an enterprise* he can expect to spend the 
rest of his working life there no matter how he does his 
work. Also, workers derive few benefits or losses if the 
enterprise makes a profit or incurs a loss. They are paid 
according to centrally prescribed wage scales rather than 
for individual skill and performance. If the enterprise 
makes a profit, most of it will be collected by the state* 
while in the case of a loss* the state will cover it through 
subsidies. This is known as "big pot meal"— everybody eating 
the rice from the same big pot (of the state).
Enĉ pKHlfcl 1b lenre
Because of China's central economic planning system* 
enterprises have no need and/or capability to worry about 
any business decisions such as producing, marketing* or 
financing, to meet the demands of the market or compete with 
others in the market. Enterprises, in general, interact 
"vertically" through their respective hierarchies rather 
than "horizontally" through the market. Production and
13
distribution enterprises tend to be large and many have 
regional or country-wide monopolies in their specified 
activities.ie Businesses are opened but seldom liquidated as 
a result of inefficient production and management. By and 
large* competition is limited to efforts at plan fulfillment 
and ovei— fulfillment.
II. The economic development 19^9-78
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In 1949, when the Chinese Communist Party founded the 
People’s Republic of China* the nation was faced with 
unemployment* inflation and starvation. To deal with these 
problems* the leaders undertook a series of new economic 
policies. The most sweeping of these was the land reform in 
rural areas where land and other assets were redistributed 
from the rich landowners to the farmers.
In the industrial sector, drastic nationalization was 
avoided and a fairly positive approach was taken towards 
existing private industrial firms. While still under state 
control, they were sometimes encouraged to expand* while at 
other times only tolerated in their present forms. By 1952, 
China had more or less recovered her pre-1949 peak of 
economic activity. The economic system did not change 
drastically.
SsKcIalisfc ibranrtsmioiraor 1 <£52H5>7
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In this period of the First Five Year Plan* the 
institutions -for bureaucratic central planning and 
management in industry and commerce were established* mainly 
-following the Soviet model. Private industrial -firms came 
under government control by nationalization* leaving the 
former owners nominal shares of the profits. In 1953, many 
private firms were converted to joint state-private 
ownership* subject to the same state planning and management 
as the state—sector enterprises. By 1956, the private sector 
in industry had been eliminated. Two—thirds of the gross 
industrial output value was produced in state—run plants 
with only one-third in joint state-private firms. The state 
was fully in command of China’s industry.13
In agriculture, cooperatives were organized* making 
possible direct planning based on output targets and acreage 
allotments. By 1956 over 90 percent of the Chinese peasants 
belonged to cooperatives. For the first time since 1949 
agriculture began to be exploited while investment priority 
was given to heavy industry. X£*
TTUkb Erasmfc fLea^p F<narcaaarall»
In 1958 Chairman Mao Zedong launched the world’s most 
extraordinary economic venture— the Great Leap Forward. This 
venture was a reflection of Mao’s dissatisfaction with 
Soviet methods and his attempt to find a Chinese way for 
economic growth. The Great Leap Forward was a bold program 
to achieve phenomenal progress on all fronts through
15
traditional rural labor methods* the mobilization of the 
masses for heroic tasks* and* from these efforts, to "enter 
communism."18 Mao's ambitious program was beyond the 
production possibility of the Chinese economy at this time. 
In the end* it coincided with the withdrawal of Soviet 
assistance and a succession of natural disasters (drought)* 
resulting in economic failure.
Within one year after the Great Leap* the agricultural 
cooperatives were transformed into communes* thus making it 
possible to place the economic activities of the Chinese 
rural population under direct government control.
The events of this period demonstrate how* in a 
centrally planned economy* mistakes made by one single 
political leader can lead to national economic disaster. 
This circumstance has played and will continue to play a 
very significant role in China's political* economic* and 
cultural development.
O&ecaB-WvEo-y amnfl trteaafl JaBS-fccrErrolt p 2.<SP&'Q>-i&S
Because of the failure of the Great Leap Forward, by 
late 1959 and early 1960, not only had agriculture and light 
industry been badly hit, but the rate of growth in heavy 
industry had fallen to virtually zero. The Chinese 
leadership* no longer dominated by Mao* began to make 
fundamental changes. 1<f* More liberal economic policies were 
introduced, including private plots for farmers. Most 
important was the priority given to the development of
16
agriculture such as added emphasis on rural industries* 
agricultural machinery, and chemical fertilizers. In 
December 196**, when Premier Chou En—Lai addressed the Third 
National People’s Congress, he reported the recovery of the 
economy and suggested that China pursue the Four 
Modernizations: industry, agriculture, defense, and science 
and technology. By 1965, the economy was growing rapidly in 
a balanced way, reaching a national output level that was 
over 60 percent higher than that of 1961. In the following 
year, the Cultural Revolution burst in the skies above 
Ch i n a .
THKe (Knaasft; (Pres Iteftaur a am CtoaHtomrailL lonit ionra £966—"76
The Cultural Revolution is also called the "Ten Years 
of Turmoil." The Chinese administrative and economic system, 
as well as the cultural and educational system, were under 
severe attack by millions of Red Guards. Unlike the Great 
Leap Forward, which was launched to remedy economic 
problems, the Cultural Revolution was mainly a political 
struggle, although economic issues were argued. Economic 
policies became dominated by political slogans rather than 
economic considerations.
In the name of destroying the old cultural traditions, 
which were blamed for hindering social revolution, the Red 
Guards grasped political power from "persons in authority 
taking the capitalist road" and transferred it to the 
radical elements of the Communist Party. The ensuing
17
political turmoil, plus the demands for higher wages by 
workers, resulted in a resolution to -freeze all prices at 
the end of 1966. This situation lasted for over a decade and 
prevented the proper functioning of China’s price system. 
During this period, the cultural and educational systems 
were also severely hurt. Higher education practically
ceased; total enrollment dropped from 674,000 students in 
1965 to 48,000 in 1970. x& Millions of the best and 
brightest— a whole intellectual generation— were exiled to 
the countryside to get "reeducation from peasants." The 
results of the Cultural Revolution are still being felt in 
current economic reform.
F a i l e d !  ctoxcpirnBoise„ V W 7 7 — 7 &
During 1977 and 1978, Hua Guofeng, the Premier and 
Party Chairman since 1976, attempted to find a middle ground 
between the rival policy positions and their respective 
leaders and followers. On one hand he led a decisive coup 
against the "Gang of Four" leftist leaders and their 
supporters, and on the other hand he continued to judge the 
Cultural Revolution as a success. In agriculture he 
continued to develop the Dazhai/Xiyang program of advanced 
collectivization that had dominated the 1960s and 1970s. In 
industry he continued to support the left’s industrial 
model— Daqing oi I—1fields. x'p With slogans associated with 
the Great Leap Forward, Hua envisaged 11 a new period of 
development.” He put forward a new ten—year plan with high
18
goals to be achieved mainly by dint of great sacrifice and 
effort of the people. This was unattainable under the 
economic conditions of that time. For example, the ten-year 
plan called for the development of the equivalent of ten new 
Daqing oil—fields while the reality was that there were no 
immediate prospects for even one new oil—field of that size. 
The situation was not changed until the end of December, 
1978.
OrsagD-fctKr 3
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In December* 1978, the Third Plenum of the Eleventh 
Party Central Committee was held. Deng Xiaoping* a highly 
committed reformer* and his supporters scored a decisive 
victory* and the path to the subsequent program of reform 
was cleared.
I• Pressures for reform
There are many factors influencing the reforms both 
internal and external.
EmrikcsrmaE iF&3z{bmr&
The traditional central planning system had made a 
significant contribution to the economic transformation of 
China, When China was initially freed from a protected 
feudal rule and from the Western blockade* when her battered 
economy still lay in ruins* when technology and productivity 
were backward and low* and when the social framework was 
primitive* this system played a very important role in 
pooling meager resources* funds* and skills* rehabilitating
19
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the devastated economy, and implementing economic 
reconstruction.eo
This system, however, over—centralizes decision-making 
power, minimizes producers” autonomy, hinders the 
development of a commodity economy, minimizes the role of 
market prices, and reduces producers’ incentives, all 
resulting in a lack of flexibility, inefficiency, and waste. 
The economic system has long been a stumbling block to 
national economic development and must be thoroughly 
overhauled.
The inherent deficiencies of the system, especially in 
the state run economy, have long been recognized in China. 
The discussion of system reform in 1978 was actually a 
resurrection of the intense debate of the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. Unlike previous debates, criticism of the 
system in 1978 was based on widespread disappointment with 
the performance of the economy, in particular with the slow 
improvement in the general standard of living for two 
decades after completion of the socialist transformation in 
the late 1950s, and with the fact of persistent poverty in 
some parts of the country. The pressure for economic reform 
thus stemmed partly from the country’s changing priorities, 
especially the growing concern with consumption. Pressure 
for reform had also arisen from the recognition that future 
development must be based on more efficient use of resources 
rather than on mobilization of resources as in the past, and
ai
-from the awareness that maintaining growth and modernization 
would be difficult in isolation from international
technological development .e *
Politically* the social and political stabilization was 
another issue. By 1976, almost twenty years of "leftist” 
mistakes had dragged the Chinese economy to the brink of 
collapse. The biggest mistake was the Cultural Revolution* 
which not only ruined the economy* but also reduced the 
people's support and lowered the party's prestige. If this 
situation had continued a few more years with increasingly 
deteriorating living conditions* the People's confidence in 
the CCP and its ideology would be shaken even more* and it 
was highly possible that a politically unstable situation 
would occur.ee 
EsfteinnsjB fac&m's
In 1978* China opened her door to the outer world and 
began to establish normal relations with most Western 
countries. This offered China a more favorable opportunity 
in the 1980s to increase her participation in international 
trade. Meanwhile* this required a more flexible economic 
system.H3
After nearly 30 years of isolation from the outer 
world* China finally opened her door to modern Western 
management* science and technology* culture and ideology. 
Most impressive to the Chinese people were the economic 
accomplishments of the West and the living standards of its
22
people. Chinese people, including the party members and
cadres, realized that after the "ten years of turmoil" they
were behind other nations. Mhile complaining and 
criticizing, the majority of the Chinese people hoped and 
urged the government to make changes to ” catch up with the 
others" (actually shorten the distance between each other.) 
Since 1979 the most important changes have been in economic 
reform, both in policy and structure of the system.
11 . Progress of reform
There have been many changes in the system of economic 
management since 1979 although some important issues remain 
unsolved. On some fronts the changes have been substantial, 
while on others, minor. They represented the beginning of 
economic reform that had great consequences for the country 
in the past and will continue to have in the future.
Basically, the reform sought to improve the management 
and efficiency of lower level administrative and economic 
units by giving them greater responsibility and autonomy; 
linking income and rewards more directly with output and 
production; and relying more on the market and indirect
economic instruments instead of administrative measures to 
influence their activities^'* The major components of the
reform may be summarized as follows;
OSaaall jjuaslfcerEHnirtfc
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The reform process started with the implementation of 
policies called ''readjustment” which were aimed at improving 
living standards by increasing the share of consumption in 
national income* giving much higher priority to light over 
heavy industry, and seeking greater benefits from foreign 
trade.
nftewmEiulfclamro
Beginning in 1980, a formal revenue—sharing system was 
introduced to give greater autonomy to provincial 
governments. Each province was allowed to retain a fixed 
proportion of the revenues it collected, which determined 
its total expenditure. Within this total, the provincial 
government was also given more freedom in choosing the 
composition of its expenditure. This reform was intended to 
stimulate provincial revenue—gathering efforts. Most 
provinces were also permitted to retain, besides a specified 
fraction of industrial and commercial tax revenues, all the 
profits remitted by provincially and sub-provincially 
controlled enterprises.53 
Dteffcmtro mrfF ItOce sifcadt© ®tnnranK=J57
1) Ownership of the means of production
China basically completed the socialist transformation 
of the means of production as early as 1956, but pushed too 
fast and too hastily far ahead of the state of economic 
development. Since 1979, there have been great changes in 
terms of ownership of the means of production, basically in
E**
the collective and individual sectors. In the state economy, 
there has been no major change in formal property rights. 
State ownership still plays the dominant role in the 
national economy. Within the state economy, no big 
institutional changes have taken place. Some small 
corporations such as restaurants were sold out to collective 
corporations or individuals. Some other corporations issued 
"stocks"— but only a small number of shares— in the market. 
What changed most has been operational, i.e., the means of 
operation to separate ownership from management. Beginning 
in 198E, a leasing or contract system was put into practice, 
allowing some medium-sized and small businesses to be leased 
or contracted by individuals or collectives from the state 
and run virtually as private companies. The lessee pays 
takes and rent for the use of the shop or the factory and 
keeps the rest of the profit— or absorbs the losses if any. 
For large and medium—sized enterprises, the contract system 
was introduced. The manager, on behalf of the enterprise, 
contracts with the state to render a certain amount of 
profit and keeps the rest over the contracted amount.
E) The locus of economic decision-making
One of the central dimensions of the economic reform 
has been the attempt to change the relationship between the 
state apparatus and the state enterprises through the policy 
of expanding enterprise autonomy (kuoda qiye zizhuquan). 
Since 1979, enterprises have been given greater decision­
25
making powers with respect tD the use of retained profits, 
production planning, sales of output, experimentation with 
new products, expenditures of funds, capital expansion, and 
personnel administration. In 1983 the director 
responsibility system was introduced, under which factory 
directors assumed full responsibility for their factories' 
production, operation, and management.
For example, in terms of production, enterprises may 
now choose, in light of demand and their comparative 
advantage, what to produce once plan quotas are met. In 
personnel management, they have the right to distribute 
bonuses at their own discretion, with the guidelines 
stipulated by the state. They are even given the right 
either to impose penalties on workers, who through 
negligence incur severe economic losses for the state, or to 
dismiss those whose performance is unsatisfactory, though 
real cases have been few. In terms of foreign trade, more 
enterprises are being given the right to export their 
products and to retain a portion of the foreign exchange 
thus earned. This foreign exchange can, in turn, be used for 
the import of foreign technology, equipment, and raw 
materials if approved by the acting authority as absolutely 
necessary.
3) Price formation
The uniform price system has been replaced with a 
three-tier price system. The state sets the prices only of
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those goods on quota that are essential to the economy or to 
the people's living standard; for above-quota goods* the 
state either sets up a price ceiling below which
fluctuations are allowed within a specified range; and 
potential buyers and sellers can negotiate prices, except 
those of products under state unified purchase. In practice, 
prices in the street markets are not regulated, and the 
prices of nonessential manufactured consumer goods, formerly 
controlled mainly at the county level, have been 
deregulated. While producers may freely dispose of their 
above-quota output, they may also bargain with the buyers 
such as other enterprises and retail stores. There are 
also some conventionally administered adjustments of 
specific prices to correct distortions that affect 
profitability and production decisions.
*») Incentives to producers
There have been more incentives to producers in terms 
of profit retention. In 1980, more than 6,000 industrial 
enterprises participated in the national experiment, 
surrendering 87 percent of their profits, retaining 10 
percent for themselves, with 3 percent used for repaying 
debt and other prescribed expenditures. About 80 enterprises 
were also selected by their provincial government 
administrations to operate independently, being responsible 
for their own profits and losses and only paying taxes 
instead of turning over their profits to the state and
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retaining all profits after taxes.27 This tax system was 
applied nationally in 1984, generating relatively more local 
initiative and efficiency in terms of management and 
operation. Despite many technical problems and many issues 
of debate* the purpose was obvious— to create an incentive 
system for enterprises so that increasing profits or cutting 
losses was rewarded by more retained profits. Retained 
profits may* within limits* be used at the disposal of 
individual enterprises. They are encouraged to use a 
substantial part (up to 40 percent in practice) to pay 
worker bonuses based on individual or group performance and 
to improve worker welfare, especially housing. The remaining 
60 percent is to be used for investment to improve, 
modernize* and expand the enterprise's productive 
capacity.ea Under the contract system* the enterprise has to 
reduce the retainable profit and employee bonuses if the 
contract is not fulfilled. Together with the depreciation 
allowance and maintenance funds, the enterprise can 
innovate, renovate, and expand production. In the wage 
system, wages vary according to enterprise revenues. For 
workers, rewards are still not tied to individual 
performance because wage increases and bonuses are 
distributed equally. There is, however, an increased use of 
bonuses and a greater use of piece rates as incentives. In 
1986 China introduced a system of labor contracts for 
factory workers. Now new workers are encouraged to sign
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contracts to work ■for up to three years in factories- Once 
the contract is finished, the worker has no further right to 
a job or benefits.s‘9' If there is a need, the workers may be 
reemployed.
5) Competition
As a rule, an enterprise that pursues the principle of 
division of labor and produces on a large scale can lower 
costs and win in competition. Since 1979, various models of 
vertical and horizontal coordination and integration have 
been produced. The first model pools together all factories 
producing similar products into a specialized corporation. 
The second model consists of state enterprises incorporated 
with factories owned by cities or towns or production 
brigades. The third model involves an integration between 
regions providing raw materials with regions processing the 
materials. The fourth model consists of agriculture-
industry—commerce jointly operated enterprises, i.e., 
factories and affiliated stores join with state farms or 
production brigades to engage in manufacturing, processing, 
and marketing. The fifth model comprises various types: 
corporations such as joint—venture with foreign capital, and 
single-venture by foreign corporation.
Operationally, competition is also generated. There are 
many more distribution channels than before. Producers have 
also been allowed to establish their own retail outlets for 
above-plan sales. Wholesalers are no longer obliged to
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purchase the whole of a producer’s output* especially 
manufactured consumer goods* but can be somewhat more 
selective about what they buy and from whom. Likewise* 
retailers are no longer obliged to purchase only from local 
wholesalers* but can buy above—quota products directly from 
local producers and seek goods in other localities or 
regions.30 In terms of marketing* there are more and more 
commercials appearing on TV, radio* and in other media.
HEr&saunt croEleirillvie aranS Irafiivldktflajl. scearfcnnr
In the past it was believed that state-owned 
enterprises were superior to collective or individual 
enterprises because they represented ownership by "the whole 
people". The urban collective and individual sector, 
therefore, had been greatly neglected in China. On the one 
hand, individual and small collective activities had 
declined in importance since the 1950s, and by the mid-1970s 
they had nearly disappeared. On the other hand* large urban 
collectives had been managed much like state enterprises, 
with little autonomy.31
In 1979 the new leadership began to replace the past 
policies of restricting, discriminating against* and even 
eliminating the sector of private ownership with a policy of 
active direction, proper promotion and better control. As a 
result, In the cities, unemployed workers were urged and 
encouraged to create cooperatives or to set up private 
businesses. They provided goods and services demanded not
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only by individual consumers but by state enterprises as 
welly which they could sell in "officially controlled," but 
relatively free, markets.312 Because of the high
profitability of the individual businesses, many workers in 
state or collective enterprises quit their jobs and started 
their own businesses. By the end of 1900, more than 800,000 
people were operating individual businesses, compared to 
about 300,000 people in the previous year, and in 1981 the 
number passed 1.1 million. Likewise in 1980, employment in 
urban collectives grew twice as fast as that in state 
enterprises.33 In 1981 the employment in urban collectives 
reached nearly 35.68 million workers and staff— almost one- 
quarter of the national total.
In terms of allocation of energy, materials, and 
credit, urban collective enterprises have been given higher 
priority than ever before. They have also been given more 
autonomy in purchasing, production, sales, human resources 
management, and financial planning. More and more collective 
enterprises have been granted a lease or a contract under 
the "economic responsibility system" to operate more or less 
on their own. By the end of 1984, over 11,000 industrial 
enterprises and 58,000 commercial enterprises had reportedly 
been rented out.
Tlhas rnrrr—mros secifcmnr
The reforms in the commune sector since 1979 have 
undergone several phases. First was the restoration of the
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rights and responsibilities of the commune and its 
subordinate units (brigade and production team) in their 
role as collectives, especially for the latter, and they 
were encouraged to implement the principle of distributing 
income in proportion to work accomplished. Meanwhile, 
private household plots were expanded rapidly. By 1982, the 
household plots were increased to 15 percent of the total 
cultivated land, compared to an average of 6.** percent 
during the Cultural Revolution.3*
Then came the wide adoption of the household 
responsibility system, in which individual farmers signed 
contracts to hand over fixed amounts of produce and sell the 
extra to local markets for higher prices. Collective work 
broke down, land was subdivided into household tracts, farm 
machinery acquired collectively by the brigade or the 
production team was either subdivided, sold, leased or 
distributed by the collectives to individual peasant 
households. In late 1981 the household responsibility system 
was officially acknowledged as universally acceptable. At 
that time, 45.1 percent of production teams had already 
switched to this system and by the end of 1983, 97.9 percent 
of production teams had adopted it.3A
The institutional collapse of the People’s Commune was 
the third, and maybe the final, phase. According to China’s 
1982 Constitution, the People’s Commune formally ceased to 
exist as an integrated unit of self-government. Instead,
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township(zheng) and vi1lage<xiang) bureaucracies, under the 
administrative hierarchy of the provincial bureaucracy, 
replaced its political and administrative functions. So 
called "village committees," which replaced production 
brigades, administer several villages <formerly production 
teams) whereas the township administers up to a dozen 
villages. By 1984 the township and village government was 
established in most parts of the country.37
In 1985 the second stage of the rural economic reform 
began with the abolition of the state'monopoly over the 
purchasing and marketing of major farm products. Except for 
a few selected products such as tobacco and medicinal herbs, 
which are under government contract, all other products are 
now sold by peasants on the market at market prices.
III. Economic achievements of the economic reform
Since the reform of 1979, China has experienced 
impressive economic achievements. Real economic growth has 
averaged 10 percent a year for the past 8 years. This figure 
underestimates the true growth because China's definition of 
GNP excludes almost all the service sector, while services 
were growing by over 25 percent a year in 1984-86. Reform, 
then, seems to have increased overall growth by two 
percentage paints to a rate which doubles real GNP every 7 
years. This is especially remarkable for a nation of more
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than 1 billion people with limited resources and 
technological know-how- In less than 10 years China's per 
capita income more than doubled from $150 to $350.3B In the 
market there are greatly increased amounts and varieties of 
food* clothing* and consumer goods.
China's agricultural reforms are regarded as a huge 
success and have improved the lives of BOO million Chinese 
farmers. Farm output rose by between 4 percent a year (for 
grain) and over 15 percent (for cotton) in the 9 years after 
1978. China's farmers increased their earnings by more than 
they did throughout the first 30 years of communist rule* 
from 134 yuan per capita in 197B to 424 yuan per capita in 
1 9 8 6 . Many peasants who lived in mud huts a few years ago 
are building brick homes* more and more of them equipped 
with TV antennas poking through roofs. For the first time in 
history China has enough grain to export and to feed a 
population of more than 1 billion. The results in industry 
to date have been less impressive. However, the industrial 
output of the state sector increased by 81 percent from 1978 
to 1986 while that of the urban collective rose 220 percent, 
albeit from a much lower base.'*0 Workers' living standards 
have also increased with increasing income. In cities, 
three-bicycle families— the equivalent of three cars in a 
U.S. suburban garage— are now commonplace. More and more 
families are replacing their old small black and white TVs 
with larger color TVs.
The sad story is that the agricultural miracle is over 
unless policy is revamped. Furthermore! the industrial 
reform has only marginal impact in the cities and now also 
faces obstacles.
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I. Traditional resistance to re-form
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The time's not been long since the individual economy 
once again took up its legitimate place in the arena of 
our country's economic life. Since the Third Plenum of 
the Party's Eleventh Central Committee (December 1978), 
the majority of people have enthusiastically welcomed 
it* some people examine it with a suspicious eye, (and) 
part of the people reject it with disgust in their 
hearts. **1
These lead lines come from an early 1983 People's Daily 
newspaper. They alerted their readers to the fact that, some 
four years after China's top party leaders had unequivacably 
endorsed the petty private sector with its open-air fairs 
and its sidewalk stalls, a range of opinions still sliced up 
the popular stance toward this business. This is not 
uncommon.
As a dynasty, Maoism in China is little more than a 
quarter of a century old? but as an organized movement, 
Chinese communism is sixty years old. On the other hand, 
China's history can be traced back three thousand years with 
a feudal ideological system based on the doctrine of
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Corrfucius and Mencius, and its weight on the present is 
still enormous. Therefore, it would be wrong either to 
underestimate both the resolve and the capacity of the 
communists to uproot old customs and habits and replace them 
with a "newborn socialist thing" or to discount the staying 
power of tradition.^® Traditional thinking and habits 
enforced by a self-reliant natural economy and a "socialist” 
experience of more than 30 years, long-ingrained beliefs and 
fear, and self interest all played part in the people’s 
"reasoning" of economic reform.
The present system has remained in force for more than 
thirty years so many people are used to it. Some comrades 
are still wondering if reliance on the market forces, 
capital and land charges, production for profit, and
material incentives are compatible with socialism. Others 
have fears that systemic reforms would mean loss of party 
control over the main directions of the economy and that 
liberalization in the economic sphere might lead to demands 
for liberalization in the cultural, social, and even
political spheres. A change in the economic system will also 
affect vested interests in certain special interest groups. 
The party and the state bureaucracy fear that they would 
lose power if enterprises were free to respond to market
forces. Managers selected more for their political
reliability than for their entrepreneurial skills are less 
than enthusiastic about reforms that require them to sell
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products in a competitive buyers* market* and workers want 
to know how price changes associated with re-forms will 
affect their real income.'"3
11 - Political factors
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Economic reforms inevitably influence the distribution 
of power and income and may at the same time bring some 
negative side-effects. They thus reguire strong political 
support if they are to be successful. However* there have 
been two major setbacks for economic reforms in China since 
1979, both started first in political and cultural areas. In 
1983 the campaign against "Spiritual Pollution" (that is* 
contamination by bourgeois Western life-styles and ideas) 
sent a chill through the Chinese intellectual community and 
created tremendous confusion among party members and 
ordinary people.
In January 1987, after students* demonstrations for 
more democracy and freedom, Mr. Deng Xiaoping launched a 
bad-tempered attack on intellectuals and party members who 
had allowed a debate on "political reform"— meaning 
liberalization and democratization— to be carried on in 
China's press for the past year. The debate raised the 
question whether Mr. Deng’s economic reforms would lead to a 
political loosening that might one day erode the party’s
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monopoly of power. At the same time? the conservatives used 
the official press to launch a campaign against "Bourgeois 
Liberalism?" the new code—word in China for anything the 
party decides is out of line.'*** These two setbacks? while 
affecting the steps of economic reform? signified the 
instability of political support.
Parity iraagyg auroO SMuirteaaEcraccy
The Communist Party is the only acting party in China. 
On the principle that the party provides leadership for the 
state (the administrative organs of government)? and the 
state manages the economy? the party determines basic 
policy. Party leadership is exercised both centrally and 
locally. Although party members comprise only a small 
percentage of the adult population (6—7 percent in 1983)? 
they still occupy most of the responsible jobs. This fact 
points out a crucial question: whether or not they are
eligible or responsible for their positions. Party image? 
therefore? is very strategic when the party is leading its 
people in building the Four Modernizations. However? because 
of the failure of the Great Leap Forward and ten—year 
turmoil of the Cultural Revolution? the party's image was 
badly hurt during those periods. Furthermore? the problems 
of corruption and bureaucratic privilege occurring since the 
economic reform of 1979 are a greater inherent danger to the 
future of the reforms? as they evoke public discussions of 
luxurious consumption and corrupt behavior and threaten to
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undermine public confidence. Dwight Perkins stated:
For nearly three decades China's leaders extolled the 
virtues of working selflessly for the common good. 
Party members, in particular, were expected to live by 
those principles. In reality senior officials* 
including party cadres* were paid substantially higher 
wages than ordinary workers and received other special 
privileges*......* but the special privileges of the
elite were largely hidden from view behind the closely 
guarded gates of Zhongnanhai in Beijing and other 
similar places where the elite lived. Conspicuous 
consumption was a formula for personal political 
eclipse. Those without political power basically lacked 
the means to get rich.**3
By the mid— 19BOs* however* party cadres have had to sit 
back and watch others with less influence and power get 
rich. Mithout a legal way to enrich themselves* many give 
in to the temptation to turn political power into economic 
gain.
Besides party image* bureaucracy is another issue. The 
bureaucratic system that the Communists have established for 
more than thirty years is a huge obstacle to economic 
reforms. Characterized by overlapping and ill—defined
jurisdictions* the bureaucracy is a large* self-serving, 
enormously complex and unwieldy* highly politicized system. 
Theoretically* the response of units at the bottom to 
changes of policy at the top is remarkably quick and 
uniform. In China* however* that is not necessarily the 
case. There is a phenomenon described in a popular saying: 
"for every policy of the central government, there is a 
counter-policy at the local level." Although top leading 
officials may have a sense of urgency* most of the rank and
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■file at lower levels show little zeal "for change. These 
bureaucrats have become accustomed to "eating three Tull 
meals a day yet doing no work without revolutionary will.” 
In factories! party secretaries can watch over, and most oT 
the time outrank, Tactory managers. Besides, there is a 
staTT oT party members in the oTTices oT the Public Security 
Department, the Communist Youth League, and the like doing 
non-production work in a Tactory? and the Tactory is held 
responsible Tor all their salaries. 
lTItae (c<n̂ rgPTT<EB«Eims£vEgtess <aif dkacaKinracy ami! laro
According to American economic experts, there is a need 
Tor comprehensiveness oT democracy and law IT the economic 
reTorm is to succeed. Economic reTorms d on’t automatically 
change the basic structural Teatures oT Chinese politics. 
There has never been a truly pluralistic system in China, in 
the sense oT either suTTerance oT a variety oT contending 
ideologies or tolerance oT an organized competition Tor 
political power independent oT party control. The system oT 
one—party rule hinders the Tree Tlow oT ideas and the 
process oT change and adaptation. The press remains a 
centrally coordinated instrument oT persuasion. Newspapers 
can criticize violations oT policy, but not the policies 
themselves. <*<s*
BeTore 1979 China was a lawless society in the literal 
meaning oT that term (there was not even a published 
criminal code.) In 1979 China started to reTorm the law
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system. Some 300 laws and regulations have been adopted 
since 1979, 350 of" them dealing with economic matters.**7
China now has 2,900 local courts, 300 intermediate courts, 
29 high courts at the provincial level, plus separate
military and maritime courts. That’s a great improvement
over the Cultural Revolution, when rule was by mob. However, 
simply drafting new laws or having courts of various levels 
may not produce a fair legal system. Interpretation still 
depends more on changeable party guidelines as it moves 
party-appointed judges, usually retired officials or
soldiers, than on the letter of the law. As Chinese people 
complain, "The rule of law in China has often amounted to 
little more than the whim of officials."**® They have so far 
paid little attention to legal procedure. The anti-crime 
campaign is an example. In 1983 top leading officials
ordered a crackdown on crimes, calling for fighting crime 
more seriously, harder, and quicker (than the rule of law) 
while ignoring proper procedures. Also, there are big gaps 
in the legal edifice, e. g., lack of corporation or tort
law. A satisfactory legal framework for commercial cases may
not be ready for a decade or so.
III. Economic factors
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Since the elements of reform are highly interrelated,
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they should be mutually consistent and internally
comprehensive if the reform is to be implemented
successfully. China's economic reforms, even before the 
political storm spread over Beijing, had run into trouble. 
While the agricultural three-quarters of the economy is
being gradually freed from central control, the industrial 
one—quarter is still tightly controlled. The tension between 
the more liberalized and regulated parts of the economy is 
growing, and this is slowing the reforms. For example, 
increased state prices for farm produce in recent years have 
been mostly offset by the rapidly rising cost of
agricultural inputs such as gasoline, equipment, machinery, 
and chemical fertilizers. This is no surprise because 
‘'reformed” agricultural produce is in relatively abundant 
supply while "unreformed" manufactured goods are scarce.49 
The result is increased cost of agricultural produce and 
less profits for farmers.
Within industry, industrial prices bear no relation to 
scarcities either inside China or in the world. In China 
prices of all kinds of basic goods— from energy and steel to 
transport and investment— are so low that they are 
chronically scarce; prices of manufactured goods are 
comparatively high but demand is so great for some consumer 
goods such as TV sets that they are in short supply too. 
Under the conditions of all-round shortage, increased raw 
material prices will simply cascade through the economy
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because many consume)— goods producers will be able to pass 
on all the increased raw material cost to customers. 550 
Inflation, which has been such a great concern to 
consumers, has become an obstacle to price reform. In 1984— 
85, China eliminated price controls on all but 86 products 
and raw materials, bringing about that old ’’capitalist 
evil"— inflation, which has not yet abated. According to 
official figures, for the first six months of 1987 inflation 
in urban areas ran at an annual rate of about 10 percent, 
and some Western economists estimated that the actual figure 
was closer to 20 percent. The higher prices have been more 
painful for urban workers than for farmers and others. Wage 
increases in state-run enterprises lag well behind price 
increases. The price boosts of food and consumer goods have 
stirred widespread complaints and a fair amount of 
skepticism among consumers about the wisdom of price 
reform.31
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The transformation of the Chinese economy to 
modernization also faces many purely economic or technical 
constraints, the principal of which can be listed as 
fol lows
a/ Arable land. Compared with its population of almost 
1.1 billion people— almost one—quarter of the world's 
population, China has only 100 million hectares of arable 
land, about 7 percent of the world’s total. While the
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population is growing at an annual rate of 14 million, 
cultivated land has been reduced at an annual rate of SO 
million mu (1.33 million hectares), an area equivalent to 
the farmland in Fujian province.553
b/ Foreign exchange. China faces a critical shortage of 
foreign exchange because reserves, which stood at $16.7 
billion in 1984, fell by 40 percent in early 1986 to $10.35 
billion. Projects that require hard currency are being 
postponed or even cancelled. The government is also finding 
it difficult to obtain foreign exchange to pay foreign 
investors while most foreign firms are accumulating huge 
reserves of Ren min bi yuan which can not be converted into 
foreign currency. Ren min bi yuan, while depreciating more 
than SOO percent since 1981 causing most foreign firms to 
suffer great losses, is still high against hard currency, 
hindering exports.
c/ Energy in all forms, with a special need for oil.
The gross output value of agriculture and industry must be 
quadrupled by the end of this century, but energy supplies 
can only be doubled.
d/ Raw materials for light industry.
e/ Shortages of skilled people, especially managers, 
designers, engineers, and scientists.
f/ Lack of technical know-how, especially in fast 
changing areas like electronics, computers, and precision 
instrumentation and control systems.
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g/ Inadequate transport and communication networks.
IV- Quality of the population
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For all the -fear that turbulence at the top of the 
Communist Party will slow down China’s economic reforms* one 
of the biggest threats to the country’s prosperity is still 
its expanding population. In 1949 the population was about 
540 million; the figure at the end of 1987 was 1.08 billion* 
with over 15 million more than that of 1 9 8 6 . Equally 
important, as many as 230 million Chinese are still 
i11iterate.
Because of the strict one-child policy* the birthrate 
has slowed down. China came an impressive 14 million births 
under its official target for the five years up to 1985- 
However* the population ceiling of 1.13 billion by 1990 and 
no more than 1.2 billion by 2000 is unlikely to hold owing 
to resistance to the one—child policy and the arrival at 
marriageable age of China’s Cultural Revolution baby 
boomers. Relying on a single child for support in old age 
still does not have much appeal in China, especially if the 
child is a girl. State—run homes for the elderly are scarce, 
and China is still a long way from nationwide welfare and 
pension schemes. Without a social security system* the best 
bet for a comfortable old age is still to have many
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children. The reform in agriculture has also worked against 
the one-child policy. Most farmers now depend on the market 
instead of local officials for their income. Those who have 
done well can afford to pay the financial penalties for 
breaking the pledge of the one—child contract, especially 
one that could probably make extra profits by using another 
boy in the fields.** In the meantime* even if China's one- 
child family planning policy helps to contain the population 
ceiling of 1.2 billion by 2000, there will be a further net 
population increase of 140 million between 1986 and 2000, a 
great pressure for China’s limited resources.
Spliriibmiai si-feuafcionri tof Otatnese people
Human resources are always the most important factor in 
any society at any time. This situation also applies to the 
current economic reform in China. For the reform to succeed, 
the Chinese people are expected to work hard and 
intelligently, or sacrifice their time, energy, and even 
their lives for the better of their motherland. In reality, 
the Chinese people— beaten, inspired, traumatized, runover, 
embraced and discarded by nearly four decades of zigzagging 
political movements— their energy and enthusiasm burned out 
during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, 
have been left with a crisis of faith, confidence and trust. 
There is a saying summarizing the general spiritual 
situation of Chinese people since 1949— "In the 50s people 
loved people; in the 60s people fought with people; in the
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70s people were afraid of people; and in the 80s people 
ignore people (people take care of themselves)."
In the United States it is often said: "nothing 
ventured, nothing gained." But in China, "don't trouble 
trouble unless trouble troubles you." Chinese people tend to 
be more traditional and conservative. Those who are 
satisfied with what they have don't expect any changes while 
those who are not satisfied reluctantly "venture." In China 
there is a phenomenon called "Red-eye disease," which means 
people are envious of those who are rich and famous. Sayings 
such as "Big trees attract wind," "People are afraid to be 
famous just as pigs are afraid to be fat," and "Birds atop 
of trees get the first shot" all describe this phenomenon. 
Because "venture" is too difficult, challenging, and even 
troublesome, people prefer to be ordinary people instead of 
the target. The worst thing is that some people who 
themselves don't work hard "expect" others not to do so 
ei ther.
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The future of China’s economic re-form depends on many 
economic and nan-economic variables* some of which are 
related to past performance* while others are not 
perceptible* or are quite simply inconceivable. The record 
{political* economic* or ideological) to date* however* can 
be of help in forming an educated guess about future options 
and prospects.
I. The progress of political reform
China is a socialist country and will remain one with 
features of the "Four Cardinal Principles"— the socialist 
road* Communist Party leadership* proletarian dictatorship* 
and Marx—Lenin-Mao’s Thought. Even though Deng is not by 
nature a democrat* he has realized that there must be some 
comparable political and social progress if economic reforms 
are to proceed. The 13th Party Congress of October 19Q7 
called again for political reform. There is also some 
theoretical breakthrough of socialism. Ideologically since
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1978, the question of whether a specific policy is 
capitalist or socialist has been central to many debates,
and reformers have constantly found themselves on the 
defensive. To justify reforms, the reformers claimed that 
China is still in the primary stage of socialism— a long 
period allowing for capitalist and market-oriented 
experiments until a purer form of socialism is reached in 
the mid—21st century. This new ideology has stretched the 
limits of tolerance toward new economic forms, such as
private and mixed ownership of the means of the production
and leasing, which are not normally allowed in a socialist 
economy.
fibfeai.mistorafti'ine ineffmnro
The separation of party and government functions is one 
major component of political reform. The party will be 
responsible for drafting principles and policies, while the 
government is in charge of actual implementation. The 
political reform also called for setting up a civi1-service 
system for recruiting able professionals through 
examinations instead of the current cadre system that rests 
heavily on personal connections and loyalty to the party.
Administrative reform sounds fine in theory. In reality 
it will be hard, if not impossible, to put it into practice. 
In a state of one—party monopoly, party membership has long 
been a mandatory requirement for important positions in 
governmental and industrial sectors. Moreover, since the
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party is still meant to be the font of all wisdom? it is 
hard to define where a member’s job as a civil servant? an 
engineer or a manager begins and his party responsibilities 
end.=v
Ptn>3LIifci<cail stugBgMMrit amoU sdfcaBjmlfi-fcy
China remains a nation dependent more on the power of a 
single leader than on an institution, and the party has the 
monopoly of power. This led to the disasters of the Great 
Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Without a system 
of checks and balances there is nothing to stop some future 
party leaders from using party power to make the same
mistakes as Mao did.ss So far Deng is a highly committed
reformer, but what happens after him is still uncertain. 
Success of economic reforms, therefore, will depend largely 
on whether or not Deng’s successors are as deeply committed 
to reforms as he and have the same power to carry them out.
On the other hand, the fact that in January 1987 Deng 
had to remove from the party secretaryship his heir 
apparent, Hu Yaobang, an outspoken reformer, suggests that 
the reformers are vulnerable to a counterattack from
conservatives and reforms after Deng are uncertain.B,?
Anyway, the party faces the dilemma that the economic 
situation will get worse if the party does not continue the 
reforms, whereas if the reforms do continue, the party 
itself will lose power to newly rich peasants and
independent managers.60 Zhao Fusan, a senior scholar at the
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Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, states flatly that "the 
process of economic reforms Mill naturally bring about a 
process of democratization, the setting up of checks and 
balances in political life and the rule of law,” which are 
bound to threaten the party monopoly of power.
11 - Social and ideological reform
For all that has changed in China, much remains the 
same. Many of its people— perhaps even hundreds of millions 
— are still beyond the reach of the reforms that have been 
made.
"Feudalism retains a hold on the ideology of today's 
China," says Su Shaozhi, one of China's leading political 
scientists. Mistrust of outsiders is little changed since 
Marco Polo first set foot in China. A farmer still refuses 
to build a house higher than the neighbors' lest he be 
responsible for "raising troubles on their heads." The most 
important feudal influences are the preference for a self- 
reliant natural economy as opposed to a commodity economy, 
and authoritarianism in politics. As Su further stated, 
"unless there is a great change in the people's way of 
thinking, neither political nor economic reform will be 
successful." However, the feudal influences can be 
completely extirpated only after a high-level of commodity 
economy is fully developed, the general level of education
sa
and culture throughout society has been elevated? and the 
authority of democracy and law has been strengthened.
China does not have a tradition of legal codes designed 
to protect rights? life and property. The Confucians 
believed in a general code of morality and ritual and 
strongly opposed publicly promulgated laws. Chinese leaders? 
like their Confucian ancestors? often eschew a written legal 
code and resolve disputes before administrators rather than 
in adversarial legal proceedings. The role of lawyers is? 
consequently? severely limited.4*1 Under such circumstances? 
ensuring even a limited degree of a "rule of law" and 
limited respect for human rights in China has a long way to 
go.
From the American viewpoint? The first wave of Deng's 
reforms has vaulted China out of totalitarianism to
authoritarianism without popular demand for more freedom. 
Most people remain apolitical in the aftermath of the
Cultural Revolution and most place a premium on stability as 
well. Without widespread pressures for democracy from below? 
few fundamental changes can be expected. The future will 
depend on the ability and willingness of Deng and his 
followers to alter the ancient feudal traditions that helped 
Mao launch his peasants' revolution. Also? passive
acceptance could fade once a higher living standard is 
reached. "You begin to get at a certain level a pressure for 
greater political liberalization?" says Harry Harding? a
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China expert with the Brookings Institution. "China is not 
at that point." Most ordinary Chinese are too busy making 
money, or worrying about price increases, to bother about 
such things. The richer China gets, the more chance there is 
of converting hearts and mind, and cementing policies.
III. Economic reform
When a country's per capita income increases -from 
around $500 to $2,000, that country is in the first stage of 
economic development. This is a very critical stage because, 
at $500 per capita, the economy is still largely a peasant 
one with most families living on the land. At $2,000 per 
capita, the economy is more industrialized with less than ^0 
percent of the population concentrated on farming. Goods and 
news come in from all over the world to change the 
traditional ways of village life.6®
China’s current GNP is somewhere between $300 and $500 
per capita. In the vital first stage of economic
development, China is employing a set of policies strikingly 
similar to those that have transformed South Korea and 
Taiwan and that have enabled Japan to be an industrial 
giant. China’s aim is to quadruple real income to $800 per 
capita by the end of the century. This depends on the 
success of the economic reform.
(Eestrtsral awmftJaraiCt
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China is building "China with socialist characteris­
tics." There is no explicit or implicit intention -from the 
party to establish a capitalist market economy. Mhat has 
changed in the past and will continue to change is the 
attitude toward capitalism. The purpose is to make the 
socialist economy -function better with the help of ideas and 
methods which are typical of capitalism. This can be called 
"building socialism with Chinese characteristics.” 
Therefore, China will continue reform toward a more market- 
oriented economy.
Economic reforms, so far, have been very successful in 
the countryside. So many Chinese farmers enjoy what the
rural reforms have brought to them that even if reformers do
not seize power after Deng, it may be very difficult to
retreat from them. If there is political instability, 
however, economic reform will not come to a halt but will 
continue the zigzag pattern of the past three decades.
If the Chinese economy was able to grow between 1952 
and 1979 with the adverse conditions of inefficient central 
planning and two very serious political disturbances, then 
the economy will continue to grow substantially even if 
economic reforms progress slowly. The only difference is
that the economy will grow even faster with more favorable 
political and economic conditions.4*®
Ukrfoanro vrastfmra
During the early 1980s, most indicators of Chinese
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industrial efficiency Mere rising slowly, and during the 
mid—80s* the number of state enterprises in deficit 
increased from 13 percent of the total in 1983 to over 15 
percent in 1986.** In the first quarter of 1987, one-fourth 
of China's state—owned enterprises were operating at a 
loss-** Why has reform been so hard to undertake in cities?
The conditions that made success possible in the 
countryside are: 1/ Farmers were lent the underlying assets- 
—the land for 15 years? 2/ farm incentives were tied 
directly to their performance? and 3/ price incentives were 
improved. None of these conditions for success exist in 
cities.** Besidesj> to operate a large industrial enterprise 
efficiently is much more difficult than to operate a small 
farm. Large industrial enterprises are more dependent on 
factors outside their control than are small household 
farms. Given a piece of land* a farm household can produce 
as it pleases* subject to climatic conditions. A large 
industrial enterprise needs the supplies of equipment and of 
material input produced by other enterprises.*7 
Furthermore, urban and industrial reforms encountered more 
ideological and bureaucratic resistance than the rural 
reforms.
The complexity of urban reform, therefore, is a great 
danger to the reform process because it implies that 
mistakes in implementation are inevitable. Any mistakes will 
lead to setbacks in the economy and will undermine political
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support for further reform. For the urban reform to succeed, 
much needs to be done with several essential and 
interrelated steps. Failure to implement one of these steps 
can undermine the effectiveness of the others.68
Based on the assumption that China is a socialist 
country* public ownership of the means of production will be 
the primary principle for how the economy may be organized. 
That, however, does not imply a particular form of 
management. The new theory of the separation of ownership 
and management has got official commitment that the state 
need not directly control what it owns. Instead, it can give 
up "the right to operate" while still owning the property. 
The theory will help in justifying business leasing, land 
leasing, and share selling in a factory to its workers.
The lease and contract arrangement is one means of 
separation. It was initially used primarily for small, often 
failing enterprises, and has been proved a success. As of 
mid-1987, 10,000 to 15,000 such arrangements had been set 
up, and approximately 95 percent were operating
prof itably. Therefore, the lease and contract system will
be widely expanded in medium—sized and small enterprises, 
allowing individual or collective groups to lease or 
contract the operation of enterprises. For large and medium­
sized enterprises, workers cannot be given industrial assets 
through the lease and contract system, because the cost of a 
lease depends partly on the factory's capital, and a few
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thousand workers could never afford to rent a *1 billion 
steel mill."70 Instead* the multiple contract operation 
system will be the primary -form of operation.
Right now China’s economic planners are at odds over a 
chicken-and-egg dilemma. Which should be first: enterprise 
reform or price reform? If enterprise reform goes first, 
then managers must be judged on the basis of profit. They 
must be able to set prices that reflect both the true cost 
of inputs and market demand— impossible without price 
reform. But if price reform is to be implemented first, it 
will result in chaos unless managers, rather than party 
secretaries, have absolute power in running their 
enterprises.-71 On the national level, reforming China’s
price system always seems to be difficult. For one thing, 
long years of price stability have given consumers little 
tolerance of inflation. For another, freeing some prices 
before others is bound, at first, to cause more problems 
such as inflation and unemployment than it solves.-7*2
Considering inflation as a big concern to consumers and 
a potential threat to political and social stability, price 
reform will have to give way to price stability and be 
postponed until after enterprise reform. In October 1987, 
the Party Congress called for the separation of government 
and enterprise functions. The factory manager is to be the 
decision-maker and the one answerable to the state, assuming 
full responsibility for the production, management, and
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operation of his enterprise. The party committee will be 
responsible for implementation of general principles, and 
enforcement of political and ideological education.
With wide acceptance of the lease and contract system 
and director responsibility system, each enterprise will 
become more economically independent. This provides the 
incentives and pressure for the enterprise to compete in a 
market through which the state indirectly regulates the 
enterprises. This is called:'’The state regulates the market 
and the market guides enterprises.” However, as long as 
factor markets in the economy are still more or less 
controlled by the state and certain commodities in some 
local markets are in short supply, the enterprise will not 
be able to fully compete in such a half—open market. 
Enterprises producing those commodities in short supply 
need not be efficient enough to survive.
USmrailL mefanro
Historically, in all countries that have been through 
the transformation from $500 to $2,000 in per capita income, 
there has been a marked shift in employment out of 
agriculture and into industry and services because peasants 
leave the land in droves and settle in cities. In South 
Korea, for example, the number of farmers fell by about a 
quarter from 1965 to 1985.V3 China has 800 million 
peasants. A migration such as that which accompanied South 
Korea’s industrial growth is unlikely to happen, but
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industrial growth has to happen somewhere.
It is officially estimated that* by the end of this 
century» China’s rural labor force will rise to 450 million. 
With increased productivity and mechanization* agriculture 
will absorb less than 30 percent of the available labor* 
forestry* animal husbandry and fisheries will take up the 
other 30 percent; less than 10 percent will be employed in 
cities or in factories and mines* and the remaining 40 
percent (nearly 300 million peasants) can only enter rural 
industries, construction, transport, commerce, services and 
household—based industrial or sideline occupations.'7'* 
Therefore, rural industrialization is one way out for 
industrial growth.
The gradual concentration of land among efficient 
households has resulted in a widespread and acknowledged 
disparity in income. Those peasants unsuccessful in farming 
inevitably will have to give up their land to rich peasants 
and become employed in rural industries. This is called 
"leaving the land but not leaving the village"(li tu bu li 
x i ang).
OBctcgitfcer &
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In summary* this paper has tried to explore the Chinese 
model of a centrally controlled economic system* which is 
the main factor curbing the development of the Chinese 
economy. The economic reform since 1979 reflects China's top 
leaders' recognition of the inefficiencies of this system 
and their willingness and efforts to "remodel" the system to 
make it more efficient. The reform to date has made 
significant changes* especially in the countryside. But*
efforts and achievements aside* the economic reform has
encountered huge obstacles: traditional or conventional*
political* economic* and social.
Ten years of economic reforms have passed in China.
The policies of the reformers have brought tangible benefits
to the nation and its citizens. People of all levels and
from all occupations know that to realize the Four
Modernizations and catch up with the rest of the world* 
China has only one way out: reform.
As a result* what is at stake is not the program of 
reform* but the scope to which it can reach and the pace at
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which it will be pursued. Under the waves of reform* 
everyone has a different version and expectation of economic 
reform while most adopt a wait-and-see attitude. This poses 
a question: how to reform.
According to Chinese officials, economic reforms have 
already got a blueprint after 9 years of experimentation. 
This blueprint, while still very vague, can be changed any 
time, any moment. The future of economic reform still relies 
on political support and stability, and this political 
support and stability depend in turn on the success of 
economic reform. The road to reform can be seen as a maze, 
and, although zigzag, the trend is forward.
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